But what distinguishes psychology from other fields involved with human behavior is that it is based in the scientific method (p. 4). Such thought-provoking, tunnel-vision summaries of psychology appear often enough in this volume to warrant suggesting that the careful instructor check the volume thoroughly before adopting it. Even in the discussion of death and dying, Morris tends to be descriptive rather than analytic. Although coverage is broad, understanding the material will necessitate significant input from the instructor. Across 17 chapters, Morris does give balanced coverage to the discipline, even including a section on creativity. A good balance is struck among cartoons, photographs, and illustrations, although explanatory comments such as figure titles do not draw the parallel between textual material and illustrations. Isolated material (called "boxes" in other texts) has been used effectively to highlight selected issues, whether intellectual (content based) or philosophical (argumentative). Both traditional

In this department, CP invites discussion of reviews and of books reviewed. Here is the place for that kind of intellectual dissent that promotes progress in understanding. Seldom does a criticism merit more than half the space of the text criticized—never more than equal space and then only when the letter is interesting and well written. CP edits letters when it thinks they should be edited. Manuscripts should be sent in duplicate, double-spaced, and identified as contributions to ON THE OTHER HAND (to distinguish them from letters for the Editors' eyes only). Please include a suggested title.

**STRUCTURAL CONSTRAINTS ON COGNITIVE THEORY**

With a few minor exceptions, Eric Brown's review of my book Problem Solving (CP, 1978, 23, 999-1001) fairly represents the perspective from which it was written. In focusing on its methodological (paradigmatic) aspects, however, Brown misses what is probably the single most important contribution of the book: If one's goal is to explain, predict, and/or control the behavior of individual subjects in specific situations, then viable theory necessarily belongs to the class of structural learning theories—that is, theories that deal with individual behavior and are necessarily relativistic and must satisfy certain basic constraints characteristic of all structural learning theories.

The traditional normative paradigm of experimental psychology, which with few exceptions has been carried over intact by psychologists in studying cognitive processes, is fundamentally lacking in this respect. Computer simulation methods are equally lacking in that, while they deal with individual behavior, they fail to do so in a generalizable way. Taken collectively, these two paradigms pose a dilemma in studying complex human behavior: the choice between generalizable theories of group (i.e., average) behavior versus non-generalizable theories of individual behavior. Solving this dilemma requires that theory

satisfy structural learning constraints, a fact that does not require empirical support any more than does the fact that scientific theory may not contradict the logical requirements of supporting mathematical theory. Indeed, since this book and its predecessors were written, other investigators have had growing success in developing special purpose structural learning theories (e.g., Feibel, 1976; Seigler, 1976; Glaser & Resnick, Resnick & Glaser, 1977; Brown & Burton, 1976). However, none of these theories has the scope that is possible; in some cases, the authors apparently even failed to recognize that their special purpose theories were structural learning theories. More conscious attention to the requirements of structural learning theories and to the associated research paradigms could greatly speed progress in understanding specific areas of cognitive behavior.

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